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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This case requires us to determine the constitutionality 
of a Pittsburgh ordinance that creates a fifteen-foot “buffer 
zone” outside the entrance of any hospital or healthcare 
facility.  Pittsburgh, Pa., Code § 623.04 (2005) [hereinafter 
“the Ordinance” or “Pitts. Code”].  In relevant part, the 
Ordinance states that “[n]o person or persons shall knowingly 
congregate, patrol, picket or demonstrate” in the prescribed 
zone.  Id.  Outside of a Planned Parenthood in downtown 
Pittsburgh, Plaintiffs engage in leafletting and “peaceful . . . 
one-on-one conversations” conducted “at a normal 
conversational level and distance” intended to dissuade 
listeners from obtaining an abortion.  Appellants’ Br. 9, 17–18.  
As the City has asserted that the Ordinance applies to this 
speech, known as “sidewalk counseling,” Plaintiffs argue that 
the Ordinance is facially unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment and the District Court erred in granting summary 
judgment in the City’s favor.  Because we conclude that the 
Ordinance does not cover sidewalk counseling and thus does 
not impose a significant burden on speech, we will affirm. 
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I. Background 
 
A. Factual Background1 
 
1. History of the Ordinance 
 
In the mid- and late 1990s, Planned Parenthood was the 
site of numerous clashes between opponents and advocates of 
abortion rights as well as individuals seeking the facility’s 
services.2  In addition to seeing “hundreds” of people at the 
facility on a Saturday—“pro and anti”—the clinic was plagued 
by bomb threats, vandalism, and blockades of its entrance.  JA 
322a.  To address these incidents, the Bureau of Police 
deployed an overtime detail of “up to ten officers and a 
sergeant” to maintain order and security, often using crowd-
control barriers to separate demonstrators from each other and 
from patients trying to enter the clinic.  JA 1024a. 
                                              
1 The background summarized here is drawn from the 
record and our prior opinion in this case, Bruni v. City of 
Pittsburgh (Bruni I), 824 F.3d 353, 357–59 (3d Cir. 2016).  
Because we are reviewing a district court’s grant of summary 
judgment, we consider the facts in the light most favorable to 
the non-movants and draw all reasonable inferences in their 
favor.  See Hugh v. Butler Cty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 
266–67 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 
2 The same was true of Allegheny Reproductive Health 
Center, another clinic that provides abortions, which, in 
addition to seeing hundreds of protestors, was fire bombed, 
intentionally flooded, and had its windows shot out.   
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In 2002, Planned Parenthood moved to its current 
location at 933 Liberty Avenue.  Although the incidents 
lessened in severity, contemporaneous police logs and 
testimony from Sergeant William Hohos indicate that “the 
pushing,” “the shoving,” and “the blocking of the doors” 
continued, and the overtime detail, reduced in size, continued 
to provide a police presence.  JA 323a, JA 834a, JA 837a.  
After Pittsburgh was declared a financially distressed 
municipality in late 2003, however, fiscal constraints and the 
need for redeployment of limited police resources required the 
detail to be discontinued, and police were called to address the 
continuing incidents at the site on an as-needed basis.  In the 
wake of the detail’s discontinuation, the clinic reported an 
“obvious escalation in the efforts of the protestors,” JA 357a, 
including an increase in “aggressive pushing, shoving and . . . 
harassing behavior that included shoving literature into 
people’s pockets, hitting them with signs and blocking their 
entrance into the building,” JA 352a. 
 
In November 2005, the City Council held hearings on 
proposed legislation that eventually resulted in the Ordinance.  
Among those who testified were sidewalk counselors, clinic 
escorts, patients, and other concerned members of the 
community.  Several witnesses insisted the Ordinance was 
unnecessary either because they had never observed violent 
incidents or were unaware of “significant violence” outside the 
clinic.  JA 348a.  But other witnesses reported being personally 
harassed and prevented from entering the clinic, being yelled 
at through the glass doors of the clinic, and seeing patients 
being surrounded on the sidewalk.  A Planned Parenthood 
counselor described patients entering the clinic in a 
“psychological state [of] situational crisis,” threatening their 
health.  JA 355a.  And “without [police] supervision,” the 
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President and CEO of Planned Parenthood of Western 
Pennsylvania said, “there ha[d] been an increase in unlawful 
behavior that . . . put[] . . . patients, their families, pedestrians 
and . . . protestors at risk.”  JA 352a.   
 
The City Council also heard from Commander 
Donaldson of the Pittsburgh Police Department.  He reported 
that police had been summoned to Planned Parenthood twenty-
two times in the past six months alone to “mediate 
confrontations” and respond to incidents ranging from signs 
“obstructing the front of the building” to protestors 
“follow[ing] . . . people to the doorway.”  JA 404a.  They had 
not made any arrests, however.  According to Commander 
Donaldson, the City had on its books “laws . . . that would 
address obstructing traffic or passageways or . . . the [clinic’s] 
doorway,” but those laws would not address the precise 
problem that was occurring, namely attempts to block people 
from entering the facility before they reached its front door.3  
JA 398a.   
 
The debate on the Ordinance was extensive.  Many 
witnesses, both for and against the legislation, expounded on 
the competing interests at stake and expressed a desire to 
protect both free speech and access to healthcare, including 
abortions.   
                                              
3 The City’s designated representative, who had been a 
member of the overtime detail before it was disbanded, 
likewise attested that the criminal laws were not adequate to 
deal with protestors and demonstrators outside the clinic 
because the obstructive conduct “[wasn’t] rising to those 
levels.  It was all the underlying stuff in between.”  JA 1057a. 
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2. The Ordinance  
 
Shortly after these hearings, the City Council adopted 
the Ordinance, and the mayor signed it into law.  See Bruni v. 
City of Pittsburgh (Bruni I), 824 F.3d 353, 357 (3d Cir. 2016).  
Codified as Chapter 623 of the Pittsburgh Code of Ordinances, 
the Ordinance states, in relevant part:  
 
No person or persons shall knowingly 
congregate, patrol, picket or demonstrate in a 
zone extending 15 feet from any entrance to the 
hospital and or health care facility.  This section 
shall not apply to police and public safety 
officers . . . in the course of their official 
business, or to authorized security personnel 
employees or agents of the hospital, medical 
office or clinic engaged in assisting patients and 
other persons to enter or exit the hospital, 
medical office, or clinic.4 
 
Pitts. Code § 623.04.  The Council also ratified a preamble that 
set forth the City’s goals in adopting the Ordinance, including 
                                              
4 Although the Chapter does not define “health care 
facility,” a “[m]edical [o]ffice/[c]linic” is defined as “an 
establishment providing therapeutic, preventative, corrective, 
healing and health-building treatment services on an out-
patient basis by physicians, dentists and other practitioners.”  
Pitts. Code § 623.02.  Penalties for violating the Ordinance 
range from a $50 fine for a first offense to a thirty-day 
maximum (and three-day minimum) jail sentence for a fourth 
violation within five years.  Id. § 623.05. 
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“provid[ing] unobstructed access to health care facilities” and 
“medical services,” “avoid[ing] violent confrontations,” 
“provid[ing] a more efficient and wider deployment” of City 
services, and “ensuring that the First Amendment rights of 
demonstrators to communicate their message . . . [are] not 
impaired.”  Id. § 623.01.   
 
As originally passed, the Ordinance also included an 
“[e]ight-foot personal bubble zone,” extending one hundred 
feet around clinics, in which people could not be approached 
without their consent “for the purpose of passing a leaflet or 
handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, 
education or counseling.”  Id. § 623.03.  Following a facial 
challenge to the Ordinance, we concluded that the Ordinance 
was content neutral and each zone was constitutionally 
permissible but the combination of the two zones was not.  See 
Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263, 273, 276–81 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  On remand, the City chose to abandon the floating 
bubble zone and retain only the fixed buffer zone that 
prohibited “congregat[ing], patrol[ling], picket[ing] or 
demonstrat[ing].”  Pitts. Code § 623.04.  That choice was 
effectuated by the District Court, which permanently enjoined 
the bubble zone and required the City to demarcate any fixed 
buffer zone prior to enforcement.5     
 
                                              
5 The injunction also required that the buffer zone be 
construed to prohibit “any person” from “picket[ing] or 
demonstrat[ing]” within the zone, including those allowed to 
enter the zone pursuant to their official duties.  See Brown, 586 
F.3d at 275.  
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3. Application of the Ordinance and 
Plaintiffs’ Activities 
 
Today, the City has demarcated buffer zones at two 
locations, both of which provide reproductive health services 
including abortions.  Bruni I, 824 F.3d at 358.  Plaintiffs Nikki 
Bruni, Cynthia Rinaldi, Kathleen Laslow, Julie Cosentino, and 
Patrick Malley engage in the bulk of their anti-abortion 
activities outside the buffer zone at Planned Parenthood.  See 
id. at 359.  In contrast to the conduct that gave rise to the 
Ordinance, Plaintiffs do not physically block patients’ ingress 
or egress or engage in violent tactics.  Instead, they engage in 
what they call “sidewalk counseling,” meaning “calm” and 
“quiet conversations” in which they “offer assistance and 
information to” women they believe are considering having an 
abortion “by providing them pamphlets describing local 
pregnancy resources, praying, and . . . peacefully express[ing] 
[a] message of caring support.”6  JA 59a; see Appellants’ Br. 
9.  That message, Plaintiffs explain, “can only be 
communicated through close, caring, and personal 
                                              
6 We will use the term “sidewalk counseling” in this 
opinion with the meaning given to it by Plaintiffs.  By contrast, 
the title “sidewalk counselor” has sometimes been claimed by 
those who engage in “‘in your face’ yelling . . . pushing, 
shoving, and grabbing” consistent with aggressive 
demonstration.  Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 
519 U.S. 357, 363 (1997).  As Plaintiffs here have explained, 
however, such conduct does not constitute sidewalk counseling 
as they use the term and is “counter-productive to [their] 
message of kindness, love, hope, gentleness, and help.”  JA 
574a. 
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conversations, and cannot be conveyed through protests.”  JA 
62a.  Nonetheless, the City takes the position that Plaintiffs’ 
sidewalk counseling falls within the prohibition on 
“demonstrating”—if not “congregating,” “patrolling,” and 
“picketing” too, see JA 334a–37a—so while they can engage 
in sidewalk counseling outside the zone, they cannot once 
within its bounds.  See Bruni I, 824 F.3d at 359.  
  
Plaintiffs describe various ways that the buffer zone has 
hindered their ability to effectively communicate their 
message.  The street noise makes it difficult for people to hear 
them, forcing them to raise their voices in a way inconsistent 
with sidewalk counseling.  And at the distance at which they 
are forced to stand, they are unable to differentiate between 
passersby and individuals who intend to enter the facility, 
causing them to miss opportunities to engage with their desired 
audience through either speech or leafleting.   
 
In addition to “sidewalk counseling,” Plaintiff Nikki 
Bruni is the local leader of a group participating in the “Forty 
Days for Life” movement, a global anti-abortion campaign.7  
Twice a year, campaign participants, including Plaintiffs, pray 
outside of abortion clinics from 7 AM to 7 PM continuously 
for forty days.  They do so in shifts, and many participants wear 
                                              
7 The movement describes its mission as “to bring 
together the body of Christ in a spirit of unity during a focused 
40 day campaign of prayer, fasting, and peaceful activism, with 
the purpose of repentance, to seek God’s favor to turn hearts 
and minds from a culture of death to a culture of life, thus 
bringing an end to abortion.”  Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh, 283 
F. Supp. 3d 357, 363 (W.D. Pa. 2017).  
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or carry signs.  As the leader of the group, Bruni organizes local 
churches to ensure people are always outside of the clinic so 
“there’s always groups on the sidewalk present during the 40 
Days all day every day.”  JA 141a.  Although the exact number 
of participants is disputed, the record reflects a daily presence 
of somewhere between ten and forty people.   
 
B. Procedural Background 
About five years after we upheld the buffer-zone 
component of the Ordinance in Brown as a content-neutral 
time, place, and manner regulation, the Supreme Court decided 
McCullen v. Coakley, striking down as insufficiently narrowly 
tailored a Massachusetts law that created a thirty-five-foot 
buffer zone in front of health facilities where abortions were 
performed.  573 U.S. 464, 493–97 (2014).  The Court found 
the law “extreme,” id. at 497, and “truly exceptional,” id. at 
490: although congestion occurred at one clinic in one city 
once a week, the law applied statewide to all reproductive 
health facilities and, with few exceptions, prohibited any 
person from even “standing” in the zone, id. at 480, 493.  To 
justify this “significant . . . burden” on speech, id. at 489, the 
Court held, the government must “show[] that it seriously 
undertook to address the problem with less intrusive tools 
readily available to it,” such as arrests, prosecutions, or 
targeted injunctions, or “that it considered different methods 
that other jurisdictions . . . found effective,” id. at 494.   
 
In light of McCullen, Plaintiffs filed a complaint, 
challenging the Ordinance, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  Bruni I, 824 F.3d 
at 359.  The District Court granted the City’s motion to dismiss 
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Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims, and Plaintiffs appealed.8  
Id. at 360. 
 
We vacated the District Court’s dismissal.  Id. at 357, 
373–74.  Taking as true the complaint’s allegations that the 
Ordinance had been enforced against Plaintiffs and had 
significantly hindered their speech, id. at 369, we concluded 
that the Ordinance “impose[d] a similar burden as that in 
McCullen,” id. at 368 n.15, so that the City had the same 
obligation as in McCullen to demonstrate “either that 
substantially less-restrictive alternatives were tried and failed, 
or that the alternatives were closely examined and ruled out for 
good reason,” id. at 370.  We thus remanded for factfinding on 
these issues, as well as a determination about “the proper scope 
of the Ordinance.”  Id. at 357, 374.  Notwithstanding our earlier 
holding as to content neutrality in Brown, 586 F.3d at 273, 275, 
277, we also directed the District Court to consider whether the 
Ordinance should still be considered content neutral in light of 
                                              
8 Plaintiffs also filed a motion for a preliminary 
injunction to prevent the City from enforcing the Ordinance 
against them, which the District Court denied and Plaintiffs did 
not appeal.  Bruni I, 824 F.3d at 359–60.  In addition to 
dismissing Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims, the District 
Court granted the City’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause challenge, a 
decision we affirmed in Bruni I and that therefore is not on 
appeal here.  See id. at 360, 374–75.  Earlier in this litigation, 
Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their as-applied challenges to 
the Ordinance, their claim under the Equal Protection Clause, 
and their claim of selective enforcement against the mayor.  Id. 
at 359 n.5.  
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Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015), the Supreme 
Court’s most recent pronouncement on the dividing line 
between content-neutral and content-based restrictions.  Bruni 
I, 824 F.3d at 365 n.14.   
 
On remand, the District Court accepted the City’s 
contention that the Ordinance covered Plaintiffs’ sidewalk 
counseling as a form of demonstrating and held that the 
Ordinance was content neutral, even under Reed.  Bruni v. City 
of Pittsburgh, 283 F. Supp. 3d 357, 361, 367–68 (W.D. Pa. 
2017).  It also distinguished the Ordinance from the statute in 
McCullen as creating a smaller buffer zone and allowing 
Plaintiffs to reach their audience through sidewalk counseling 
despite the buffer zone and therefore concluded that the 
Ordinance imposed “only a minimal burden on Plaintiffs’ 
speech.”  Id. at 369–71.  Accordingly, it held that the City 
“ha[d] no obligation to demonstrate that it tried—or considered 
and rejected”—the alternatives identified in McCullen, such as 
arrests or targeted injunctions, and even if the City did have 
such an obligation, it had been satisfied.  Id. at 371–72.  The 
Court therefore granted the City’s motion for summary 
judgment.  Id. at 373.  This appeal followed.  
  
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
review a district court’s grant or denial of summary judgment 
de novo, see EEOC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 778 F.3d 444, 448 (3d 
Cir. 2015), and may affirm on any basis supported by the 
record, Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 2009).  
Summary judgment is appropriate only where “there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
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entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  
In the context of a First Amendment claim, we “examine 
independently the facts in the record and ‘draw our own 
inferences’ from them.”  Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of 
Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 157 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Christ’s 
Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 
247 (3d Cir. 1998)).  Like the District Court, however, we 
review the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party.  See Hugh, 418 F.3d at 267.   
 
III. Discussion 
 
On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that the Ordinance violates 
the Free Speech and Free Press Clauses9 of the First 
Amendment for three reasons: first, the Ordinance is content 
based and therefore subject to strict scrutiny; second, even if it 
is content neutral, the Ordinance is not narrowly tailored and 
thus does not survive intermediate scrutiny; and third, the 
Ordinance is overbroad.  After providing an overview of the 
general framework that guides our analysis, we address each 
of these arguments.  
 
 
 
                                              
9 For the reasons articulated in Bruni I, we treat 
Plaintiffs’ free speech and free press claims together.  See 824 
F.3d at 373 (“Plaintiffs’ free press claim is . . .  properly 
considered a subset of their broader free speech claim, given 
that the Freedom of the Press Clause and the Free Speech 
Clause both protect leafleting from government 
interference.”). 
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A. General Framework 
 
Plaintiffs allege that the Ordinance is unconstitutional 
on its face.  See Bruni I, 824 F.3d at 362.  A facial challenge 
“seeks to vindicate not only [a plaintiff’s] own rights,” as in an 
as-applied challenge, but also “those of others who may . . . be 
adversely impacted by the statute in question.”  Id. (quoting 
CMR D.N. Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 703 F.3d 612, 623 
(3d Cir. 2013)).  Although facial challenges in the First 
Amendment context are more forgiving than those in other 
contexts, see United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 
(1987), “all agree that a facial challenge [under the First 
Amendment] must fail where the statute has a plainly 
legitimate sweep,” Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State 
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008) (citation omitted).  
  
As we explained in Bruni I, however, “the distinction 
between facial and as-applied challenges is not so well defined 
that it has some automatic effect or that it must always control 
the . . . disposition in every case involving a constitutional 
challenge.”   824 F.3d at 363 (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 
558 U.S. 310, 331 (2010)).  Courts therefore look to “[t]he 
relevant constitutional test” to resolve the inquiry, id. (citation 
omitted), bearing in mind that a party seeking to invalidate a 
law in its entirety bears a heavy burden, see Wash. State 
Grange, 552 U.S. at 450–51; Brown, 586 F.3d at 269. 
 
Here, the relevant test is that governing free speech 
claims.  The government’s ability to restrict speech in a 
traditional public forum, such as a sidewalk, is “very limited.”  
McCullen, 573 U.S. at 477 (citation omitted).  That is because 
traditional public fora “are areas that have historically been 
open to the public for speech activities.”  Id. at 476.  In such 
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fora, the government may not restrict speech based on its 
“communicative content,” Bruni I, 824 F.3d at 364 (quoting 
Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226)—that is, the government “has no 
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, 
its subject matter, or its content,” id. at 363 (quoting Ashcroft 
v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)). 
 
By contrast, the government has greater leeway to 
regulate “features of speech unrelated to its content.”  
McCullen, 573 U.S. at 477.  Thus, “[e]ven in a public forum 
the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the 
time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the 
restrictions ‘are justified without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant governmental interest, and that they leave open 
ample alternative channels for communication of the 
information.’”  Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 
U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).   
 
The level of scrutiny a court applies to a restriction on 
speech depends on whether it is content based or content 
neutral.  If the restriction is content based, it is subject to strict 
scrutiny and is therefore “presumptively unconstitutional and 
may be justified only if the government proves that [it is] 
narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”  Reed, 
135 S. Ct. at 2226; see McCullen, 573 U.S. at 478.  If a 
restriction is content neutral, “we apply intermediate scrutiny 
and ask whether it is ‘narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest.’”  Bruni I, 824 F.3d at 363–64 (quoting 
Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 764 
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(1994)).  The threshold question, therefore, is whether the 
restriction here is content based or content neutral.10 
 
B. Content Neutrality  
 
Plaintiffs contend that the Ordinance is content based 
and thus subject to strict scrutiny because it regulates speech 
“based on subject matter, function, or purpose,” rendering it 
content based under Reed.11  Appellants’ Br. 34.  For the 
reasons that follow, we disagree.  
                                              
10 Although the parties begin their briefing with an 
application of intermediate scrutiny, we follow the Supreme 
Court’s lead in McCullen by addressing first whether the 
Ordinance is content based because the answer to that question 
determines the correct level of scrutiny to apply.  See 573 U.S. 
at 478–79. 
11 Plaintiffs make additional arguments in passing, but 
they are not persuasive.  First, Plaintiffs contend that the City’s 
purpose in adopting the Ordinance was to “target anti-abortion 
content” because the City Council’s discussion about the 
Ordinance “centered entirely on abortion and the speech 
outside of abortion facilities in Pittsburgh.”  Appellants’ Br. 
40–41.  But the Supreme Court explicitly rejected this 
argument in McCullen.  See 573 U.S. at 481–82 (“States adopt 
laws to address the problems that confront them.  The First 
Amendment does not require States to regulate for problems 
that do not exist.” (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 
207 (1992) (plurality opinion))).  Second, Plaintiffs argue that 
the Ordinance is content based as applied because it is enforced 
only outside of reproductive health facilities and therefore 
affects only abortion-related speech.  Plaintiffs did not make 
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In Reed, the Supreme Court considered the 
constitutionality of an ordinance that regulated the manner of 
display of outdoor signs depending on their subject matter.  134 
S. Ct. at 2224–25.  For example, the ordinance allowed 
“Political Signs” to be bigger in size and remain posted longer 
than those it defined as “Temporary Directional Signs.”  Id. at 
2224–25, 2227.  The Court held that the regulation was content 
based because the restrictions applied differently “depend[ing] 
entirely on the communicative content of the sign[s].”  Id. at 
2227.  As relevant here, the Court noted that whereas “[s]ome 
facial distinctions . . . are obvious,” such as “defining regulated 
speech by particular subject matter,” others are more “subtle,” 
such as “defining regulated speech by its function or purpose.”  
Id.   
 
The thrust of Plaintiffs’ argument is that the Ordinance 
is content based because the City interprets the word 
“demonstrating” to apply to sidewalk counseling but not to 
peaceful one-on-one communication about other subjects, like 
sports teams, and, as a result, law enforcement must examine 
the content of any speech to determine if it is prohibited.  
However, despite the assumptions of both parties,12 nothing in 
                                              
this argument at summary judgment below, and it is therefore 
forfeited.  See Keenan v. City of Philadelphia, 983 F.2d 459, 
471 (3d Cir. 1992).  In any event, “a facially neutral law does 
not become content based simply because it may 
disproportionally affect speech on certain topics.”  McCullen, 
573 U.S. at 480.  Reed, decided one year after McCullen, does 
not speak to these aspects of McCullen’s analysis. 
12 Although Plaintiffs contend that the City “enforces” 
the Ordinance “to suppress [their] leafletting and sidewalk 
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the plain language of the Ordinance supports a construction 
that prohibits peaceful one-on-one conversations on any topic 
or conducted for any purpose at a normal conversational 
volume or distance.  In short, the Ordinance as written does not 
prohibit the sidewalk counseling in which Plaintiffs seek to 
engage within the zone.  
 
No doubt, if the Ordinance by its terms did prohibit one-
on-one conversations about abortion but not about other 
subjects within the zone, it would be highly problematic, see 
Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2230, particularly where, as here, the speech 
alleged to be prohibited occurs on a public sidewalk and 
constitutes one-on-one “normal conversation and leafletting,” 
McCullen, 573 U.S. at 488—“core political speech entitled to 
the maximum protection afforded by the First Amendment,” 
Bruni I, 824 F.3d at 357.  But under the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance, “[i]t has long been a tenet of First 
Amendment law that in determining a facial challenge to a 
statute, if it be ‘readily susceptible’ to a narrowing construction 
                                              
conversations” within the buffer zone, Appellants’ Br. 17, the 
record does not reflect any prosecution, arrest, or even citation.  
Instead, it reflects that, except for isolated instances in which 
police were called to Planned Parenthood but took no action, 
Plaintiffs avoided the buffer zone based on an assumption, 
shared by the City, about the scope of the Ordinance.  The 
realistic threat of the City’s enforcement is sufficient for 
purposes of Plaintiffs’ standing.  See Susan B. Anthony List v. 
Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014).  As we explain below, 
however, it does not preclude us under the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance from adopting a narrowing 
construction of the Ordinance.  
 
22 
that would make it constitutional, it will be upheld.”13  Virginia 
v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988); see 
also Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 
U.S. 320, 328–29 (2006) (“Generally speaking, when 
confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute, we try to limit the 
solution to the problem.”).   
 
Of course, we may not “rewrite a . . . law to conform it 
to constitutional requirements,” United States v. Stevens, 559 
U.S. 460, 481 (2010) (citation omitted), but, as we have 
recognized on many occasions, “[i]n the absence of a limiting 
construction from a state authority, we must ‘presume any 
narrowing construction or practice to which the law is fairly 
susceptible.’”14  Brown, 586 F.3d at 274 (quoting City of 
                                              
13 As we said in Brown, “[t]his principle of 
interpretation is consistent with Pennsylvania law.”  586 F.3d 
at 274 n.13 (citing Commonwealth v. Monumental Props., Inc., 
329 A.2d 812, 827 (Pa. 1974); and Dole v. City of Philadelphia, 
11 A.2d 163, 168–69 (Pa. 1940)).  And this is a particularly 
compelling case in which to apply the doctrine given the 
constitutional concerns inherent in restricting this kind of 
speech.  As the Court explained in McCullen, “‘one-on-one 
communication’ is ‘the most effective, fundamental, and 
perhaps economical avenue of political discourse.’”  573 U.S. 
at 488 (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424 (1988)).  
Indeed, “[l]eafletting and commenting on matters of public 
concern are classic forms of speech that lie at the heart of the 
First Amendment.”  Id. at 489 (quoting Schenck, 519 U.S. at 
377). 
14 That is not to say that the City’s interpretation of the 
Ordinance is irrelevant—it is a consideration in a court’s 
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Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 770 n.11 
(1988)); see Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 
215 n.10 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining that where a state court has 
not authoritatively construed the terms of a stated policy, “we 
are . . . required to give it a reasonable narrowing construction 
if necessary to save it from unconstitutionality”); see also 
                                              
determination of whether to adopt a limiting construction.  See 
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 131 
(1992); see also Ward, 491 U.S. at 795–96.  But the City’s 
interpretation has not been adopted by any Pennsylvania court, 
and where no state court has weighed in and the Ordinance is 
readily susceptible to a “reinterpretation” consistent with the 
Ordinance’s text, the City’s position is not dispositive.  Free 
Speech Coal., Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 677 F.3d 519, 
539 (3d Cir. 2012); Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 
200, 215–16, 215 n.10 (3d Cir. 2001); see also U.S. Nat’l Bank 
of Ore. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 447 
(1993) (stating, outside of the constitutional avoidance context, 
that litigants cannot “extract the opinion of a court on 
hypothetical Acts of Congress or dubious constitutional 
principles” by agreeing on the proper construction of the law); 
Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo 
Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 946 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e are not 
required to . . . adopt an interpretation precluded by the plain 
language of the ordinance.” (citation omitted)).  While other 
Courts of Appeals take a contrary approach, see United Food 
& Commercial Workers Int’l Union v. IBP, Inc., 857 F.2d 422, 
431 (8th Cir. 1988); Hill v. City of Houston, 789 F.2d 1103, 
1112 (5th Cir. 1986), our precedent is clear, see Free Speech 
Coal., Inc., 677 F.3d at 539; Brown, 586 F.3d at 274; Saxe, 240 
F.3d at 215–16, 215 n.10.  
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Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483 (1988) (“To the extent 
they endorsed a broad reading of the ordinance, the lower 
courts ran afoul of the well-established principle that statutes 
will be interpreted to avoid constitutional difficulties.”).   
 
Here, the Ordinance is readily susceptible to a 
narrowing construction.  The text of the Ordinance says 
nothing about leafletting or peaceful one-on-one 
conversations, let alone on a particular topic or for a particular 
purpose.  And, to put a fine point on it, the floating bubble 
zone, which was enjoined years ago, did prohibit “passing a 
leaflet,” “educating,” or “counseling.”  Pitts. Code § 623.03.  
Those are not the activities that remain prohibited in the zone, 
and “when the legislature uses certain language in one part of 
the statute and different language in another, the court assumes 
different meanings were intended.”  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 
542 U.S. 692, 711 n.9 (2004) (quoting 2A N. Singer, Statutes 
and Statutory Construction § 46:06, at 194 (6th rev. ed. 2000)).  
  
The Ordinance prohibits four—and only four—
activities within the zone: “congregat[ing],” “patrol[ling],” 
“picket[ing],” and “demonstrat[ing].”  Pitts. Code  
§ 623.04.  And none of those terms, as commonly understood, 
encompasses the sidewalk counseling in which Plaintiffs 
engage.15 
                                              
15 In its briefing and at oral argument, the City justified 
its interpretation by noting that in Schenck, the injunction at 
issue referred to “sidewalk counseling” as a “form of 
demonstrating,” and the Supreme Court did not reject that 
characterization.  See Appellees’ Br. 48 (citation omitted).  But 
the Court made clear that the term as used by some protestors 
in that case was misleading given their aggressive actions, see 
 
25 
To “congregate” means “to collect into a group or 
crowd.”  Congregate, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate 
Dictionary 262 (11th ed. 2005) [hereinafter Merriam-
Webster’s]; see also Congregate, The American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language 388 (4th ed. 2006) 
[hereinafter American Heritage] (defining “congregate” as 
“bring or come together in a group, crowd, or assembly”).  To 
“patrol” is “to carry out a patrol,” defined in turn as “the action 
of traversing a district or beat or of going the rounds along a 
chain of guards for observation or the maintenance of 
security,” Patrol, Merriam-Webster’s 909, and “[t]he act of 
moving about an area especially by an authorized and trained 
person . . . for purposes of observation, inspection, or security,” 
Patrol, American Heritage 1290.  To “picket” is to “serve as a 
picket,” defined as “a person posted for a demonstration or 
protest.”  Picket, Merriam-Webster’s 937; see also Picket, 
American Heritage 1327 (defining “picket” as “to post as a 
picket” where “picket” is defined as “[a] person or group of 
persons present outside a building to protest”).  And to 
“demonstrate” is defined as “to make a demonstration,” which 
is defined in turn as “an outward expression or display” and “a 
public display of group feelings toward a person or cause.”  
Demonstrate, Merriam-Webster’s 332; see also Demonstrate, 
American Heritage 484 (defining “demonstrate” as “[t]o 
participate in a public display of opinion”). 
 
Plaintiffs’ sidewalk counseling does not meet any of 
these definitions.  While the Supreme Court has noted that a 
                                              
Schenck, 519 U.S. at 363, 381–82, and, as discussed, see supra 
note 6, such conduct falls far outside Plaintiffs’ definition of 
sidewalk counseling.    
 
26 
grouping of three or more people may constitute 
“congregat[ing],” see Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 316–17 
(1988), approaching someone individually to engage in a one-
on-one conversation no more constitutes “congregat[ing]” than 
walking alongside another person constitutes “patrol[ling].”  
And while signs and raised voices may constitute “picket[ing]” 
or “demonstrat[ing],” speaking to someone at a normal 
conversational volume and distance surely does not.  Simply 
calling peaceful one-on-one conversations “demonstrating” or 
“picketing” does not make it so when the plain meaning of 
those terms does not encompass that speech.16   
 
Moreover, the activities that the Ordinance does 
prohibit render it content neutral under binding Supreme Court 
precedent.  No doubt due to the easily identifiable nature and 
visibility of “congregat[ing], patrol[ling], picket[ing] or 
demonstrat[ing],” Pitts. Code § 623.04, the Court has 
repeatedly considered regulation of those activities to be based 
on the manner in which expressive activity occurs, not its 
content, and held such regulation content neutral.  See Madsen, 
                                              
16 Perhaps because of this disconnect between the 
Ordinance’s text and the specific expressive activities to which 
the parties have assumed the Ordinance applies, the City’s own 
witness struggled during his deposition to explain which 
specific prohibition was even applicable to Plaintiffs’ sidewalk 
counseling.  For example, when asked “[w]hat part of the 
Ordinance” would prohibit a sidewalk counselor from crossing 
into the buffer zone while talking to a patient, the City’s 
designated witness replied, “[c]all it congregating, patrolling, 
picketing, or demonstrating, or any name you wish to give it.”  
JA 337a.  
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512 U.S. at 759, 763–64 (addressing the precise language at 
issue here, “congregating, picketing, patrolling, [and] 
demonstrating,” and concluding that the injunction prohibiting 
those activities was content neutral); see also Snyder v. Phelps, 
562 U.S. 443, 456 (2011); Hill, 530 U.S. at 721; Schenck, 519 
U.S. at 383–85; United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 181–82 
(1983).17  Nor does Reed alter that conclusion.  See Reed, 135 
S. Ct. at 2228–29. 
 
In short, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance 
counsels that we impose a limiting construction where, as here, 
a statute has not been construed by a state court and is not only 
susceptible to a narrowing construction but also demands that 
construction on its face.  See Am. Booksellers, 484 U.S. at 397; 
Brown, 586 F.3d at 274; Saxe, 240 F.3d at 215 n.10.  Because 
                                              
17 We have continued to rely on Hill since McCullen and 
Reed were handed down,  see, e.g., Turco v. City of Englewood, 
935 F.3d 155, 165 (3d Cir. 2019) (declining to strike down 
eight-foot buffer zone as a matter of law because “such a 
conclusion would be directly at odds with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Hill v. Colorado” (citation omitted)), as have some 
of our sister circuits, e.g., March v. Mills, 867 F.3d 46, 64 (1st 
Cir. 2017); Act Now to Stop War & End Racism Coal. & 
Muslim Am. Soc’y Freedom Found., 846 F.3d 391, 403–04 
(D.C. Cir. 2017).  We note, however, that other Courts of 
Appeals have observed that, even if “neither McCullen nor 
Reed overruled Hill, so it remains binding on us,” the content 
neutrality holding of Hill may be “hard to reconcile with both 
McCullen and Reed,” Price v. City of Chicago, 915 F.3d 1107, 
1109 (7th Cir. 2019) (Sykes, J.), petition for cert. filed, No. 18-
1516 (U.S. June 6, 2019). 
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the Ordinance, as properly interpreted, does not extend to 
sidewalk counseling—or any other calm and peaceful one-on-
one conversations—there is no need for law enforcement “to 
examine the content of the message . . . to determine whether 
a violation has occurred.”  McCullen, 573 U.S. at 479 (citation 
omitted).  The Ordinance so read is thus content neutral and 
subject to intermediate scrutiny. 
 
C. Application of Intermediate Scrutiny  
 
Because we conclude the Ordinance does not implicate 
Plaintiffs’ speech, we could end our analysis here if this were 
an as-applied challenge.  But because Plaintiffs have brought a 
facial challenge, we briefly consider whether the Ordinance as 
applied to the remaining expressive activity of congregating, 
patrolling, picketing, or demonstrating within fifteen feet of the 
clinic entrance is “narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest.”18  Id. at 477 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. 
at 791).  We easily conclude that it is. 
                                              
18 To satisfy intermediate scrutiny, the government 
bears the burden of demonstrating that a restriction on speech 
is “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental 
interest” and “leave[s] open ample alternative channels for 
communication of the information.”  McCullen, 573 U.S. at 
477 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791).  Plaintiffs do not dispute 
the “ample alternatives” prong and, with its narrowing 
construction, “the limited nature of the prohibition makes it 
virtually self-evident that ample alternatives remain.”  Frisby, 
487 U.S. at 483.  We therefore focus our inquiry, as do the 
parties, on the issue of narrow tailoring.  
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As Plaintiffs acknowledge, the interests that the City 
seeks to protect—unimpeded access to pregnancy-related 
services, ensuring public safety, and eliminating “neglect” of 
law enforcement needs—are legitimate.19  Bruni I, 824 F.3d at 
368 (quoting Pitts. Code § 623.01); see McCullen, 573 U.S. at 
487, 496–97 (describing these interests as “undeniably 
significant” interests that are “clearly serve[d]” by buffer 
zones); see also Turco v. City of Englewood, 935 F.3d 155, 166 
(3d Cir. 2019) (recognizing the government’s significant 
interest in “protecting the health and safety of its citizens, 
which ‘may justify a special focus on unimpeded access to 
health care facilities and the avoidance of potential trauma to 
patients associated with confrontational protests’”) (citation 
                                              
19 To the extent Plaintiffs argue that the City’s stated 
interests were not substantiated on remand, the record—
including reports of violent incidents, obstruction of patients’ 
ingress and egress, and aggressive confrontations—establishes 
otherwise.  See supra Section I.A.1.  Plaintiffs’ additional 
argument that there has been no obstructive conduct preventing 
access to the clinic’s entrance in recent years and, therefore, 
that the Ordinance is no longer necessary is also belied by the 
record.  For starters, there is evidence in the record to the 
contrary.  For example, a clinic escort declared in 2014 that she 
was “aware of incidents at [Planned Parenthood] in which 
escorts were pushed by a protester and where protesters placed 
their hands on patients and thrust their leaflets inside patients’ 
coat pockets or handbags.”  JA 709a–10a.  More importantly, 
the fact that an otherwise constitutional restriction on speech is 
successful in serving the interests for which it was intended is 
hardly a reason to strike it down.   
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omitted).  Instead, Plaintiffs argue that the Ordinance is not 
narrowly tailored to those interests.  
 
To be narrowly tailored, a regulation must not “burden 
substantially more speech than is necessary to further the 
government’s legitimate interests.”  McCullen, 573 U.S. at 486 
(quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799).  At the same time, it “‘need 
not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of’ serving 
the government’s interest,” id. (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 
798), and we “afford[] some deference to a municipality’s 
judgment in adopting a content-neutral restriction on speech,” 
Bruni I, 824 F.3d at 370. 
 
In arguing that the restriction on speech here is not 
narrowly tailored, Plaintiffs do not distinguish between the 
Ordinance as read to include sidewalk counseling and the 
Ordinance as read to exclude it.  Rather, quoting Bruni I, they 
contend we “already made clear that ‘the City has the same 
obligation to use less restrictive alternatives to its buffer zone 
as . . . Massachusetts had with respect to the buffer zone at 
issue in McCullen.’”   Appellants’ Br. 25 (quoting Bruni I, 824 
F.3d at 369).  So, say Plaintiffs, just as in McCullen, the City 
had to demonstrate on remand that “substantially less-
restrictive alternatives,” including arrests, prosecutions, and 
injunctions, “were tried and failed, or . . . were closely 
examined and ruled out for good reason.”  Bruni I, 824 F.3d at 
370.  Because the City here concededly failed to make a 
showing of that magnitude, Plaintiffs contend the Ordinance 
necessarily fails intermediate scrutiny.   
 
Plaintiffs mistake the import of Bruni I in two respects.  
First, in reviewing the District Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ 
complaint, we did not conclusively determine that the City 
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“ha[d] the same obligation to use less restrictive alternatives” 
as in McCullen.  Bruni I, 824 F.3d at 369.  As appropriate at 
the pleading stage, we “accept[ed] all [of Plaintiffs’] factual 
allegations as true,” id. at 360 (citation omitted), and held that 
“[b]ecause of the significant burden on speech that the 
Ordinance allegedly imposes, the City ha[d] the same 
obligation to use,” id. at 369 (emphasis added), or show that it 
“seriously considered, substantially less restrictive 
alternatives,” id. at 357, as in McCullen.  On that basis, we 
remanded for a determination of the proper scope of the 
Ordinance, the actual burden on Plaintiffs’ speech, and a 
means–ends analysis “by the standard that McCullen now 
requires.”  Id. at 375.   
 
Second, to the extent Plaintiffs’ argument is that 
McCullen imposes on a municipality “the same obligation” as 
on Massachusetts—even in the absence of a “significant 
burden on speech,” id. at 369—they are mistaken.  As we 
recognized in Bruni I, where the burden on speech is de 
minimis, a regulation may “be viewed as narrowly tailored, 
even at the pleading stage,” id. at 372 n.20, and McCullen and 
Bruni I both observed that where there is only “a slight burden 
on speech, any challengers would struggle to show that 
‘alternative measures [would] burden substantially less 
speech,’” id. (alteration in original) (quoting McCullen, 573 
U.S. at 495).  In short, while McCullen and Bruni I made clear 
that a “rigorous and fact-intensive” inquiry will be required 
where a restriction imposes a significant burden on speech, 
Bruni I, 824 F.3d at 372, they also made clear (and logic 
dictates) that a less demanding inquiry is called for where the 
burden on speech is not significant—whether due to a 
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restriction’s scope, the size of the speech-free zone, or some 
combination of the two.20  
 
In this case, now that we have before us both a 
developed record and a narrow construction of the Ordinance, 
it is apparent that the burden it imposes is different from 
McCullen both in scope and size and is instead akin to that 
imposed by the thirty-six-foot and fifteen-foot buffer zones 
that the Supreme Court upheld in Madsen v. Women’s Health 
Center, Inc., 512 U.S. at 757, 776, and Schenck v. Pro-Choice 
Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. at 364, 380, 
respectively.   
                                              
20 In Bruni I, we explained that when dealing with core 
speech, such as sidewalk counseling, whether a restriction is 
less burdensome in “degree”—meaning size in the context we 
used it—is not necessarily dispositive of whether the burden 
on speech is significant.  824 F.3d at 368.  A court must also 
consider the burden as “a matter of . . . kind,” referring to the 
type of speech a restriction prohibits.  Id.  Elsewhere in the 
opinion, however, we also recognized that there may be cases 
where the “degree” of burden is so minimal that it, alone, will 
determine whether the burden on speech should be considered 
significant, thus potentially negating any need for the 
government to show that substantially less-restrictive 
alternatives were tried and failed or seriously considered and 
reasonably rejected.  See id. at 372 n.20 (quoting McCullen, 
573 U.S. at 495).  As “degree” could refer to the size of the 
zone or significance of the burden, depending on the context, 
and both subjects are mentioned in today’s opinion, we will use 
the terms “scope” and “size,” rather than “kind” and “degree,” 
for the sake of clarity.  
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As to scope, although the restrictions in those cases 
were more targeted in that they were created by way of 
injunction, not legislation, see Schenck, 519 U.S. at 361; 
Madsen, 512 U.S. at 757, the Ordinance is narrower in scope 
because it limits only congregating, patrolling, picketing, and 
demonstrating within a fifteen-foot buffer zone, and does not 
sweep in the “one-on-one communication,” including “normal 
conversation and leafletting,” that McCullen emphasized “have 
historically been more closely associated with the transmission 
of ideas,” 573 U.S. at 488.  Thus, so long as she is not 
“congregating” with others in the buffer zone, an individual 
plaintiff is not barred by the Ordinance from engaging in 
sidewalk counseling inside its borders.  Cf. Schenck, 519 U.S. 
at 367, 369–70, 383–84 (describing and upholding the district 
court’s decision to allow only two sidewalk counselors inside 
the fifteen-foot buffer zone); Madsen, 512 U.S. at 759 
(prohibiting not only “congregating, picketing, patrolling, 
[and] demonstrating” within the zone but also “entering”).  
 
And as to size, the relatively small buffer zone imposed 
by the Ordinance, like those in Madsen and Schenck, does not 
prevent groups like Forty Days for Life from congregating 
within sight and earshot of the clinic.  Nor does it prevent 
protestors, demonstrators, or picketers from being seen and 
heard, or any of these persons from speaking outside the zone 
with willing listeners who are entering or exiting.  See Schenck, 
519 U.S. at 384–85; Madsen, 512 U.S. at 770.  And size, while 
not necessarily in and of itself dispositive, see Bruni I, 824 F.3d 
at 368, is still a “substantial distinction” that must factor into a 
court’s analysis of the relative burden on speech,  Turco, 935 
F.3d at 163.   
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Also as in Madsen and Schenck, the record shows that 
the City resorted to a fixed buffer zone not in the first instance 
but after attempting or considering some less burdensome 
alternatives and concluding they were unsuccessful in meeting 
the legitimate interests at issue.  See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 380–
82; Madsen, 512 U.S. at 769–70.  These included an overtime 
police detail in front of Planned Parenthood until the cost 
became prohibitive once the City was declared a financially 
distressed municipality;21 incident-based responses by the 
police that proved unsuccessful in preventing or deterring 
aggressive incidents and congestion; and consideration of 
criminal laws that the police were finding inadequate to 
address the problem of protestors following patients and 
obstructing their way to the clinic.   
 
True, as Plaintiffs point out, this record does not reflect 
that the City tried or seriously considered arrests, prosecutions, 
or targeted injunctions, which Plaintiffs would have us treat as 
dispositive.  But where the burden imposed by a restriction on 
                                              
21 In McCullen, Massachusetts did not assert such 
economic hardships.  While the Court noted that “the prime 
objective of the First Amendment is not efficiency,” McCullen, 
573 U.S. at 495, it did not have occasion to consider 
circumstances where “the limitations of ‘manpower’ and the 
need to be able to deploy officers in response to emergencies” 
made it “not feasible to permanently provide a significantly 
increased police presence at the clinic,” Turco, 935 F.3d at 167.  
As we recently recognized, however, the facts “that the police 
department ha[s] finite resources,” id. (citation omitted), and a 
city has “financial restraints,” id. at 167–68, are relevant to the 
narrow tailoring analysis.   
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speech is not significant, the government need demonstrate 
neither that “it has tried or considered every less burdensome 
alternative,” Bruni I, 824 F.3d at 370, nor that it tried or 
considered every less burdensome alternative discussed in 
McCullen.  Instead, as we reiterated in Turco, this is an 
“intensely factual . . . inquiry,” 935 F.3d at 170, that must 
account for “the ‘broad principle of deference to legislative 
judgments’ and that a legislative body ‘need not meticulously 
vet every less burdensome alternative,’” id. at 171 (quoting 
Bruni I, 824 F.3d at 370 n.18).  And, as we recognized there in 
remanding for further fact-finding, a municipality can 
demonstrate that it “attempted . . . [or] considered alternative 
means of bringing order to the sidewalk” even if it “ha[s] not 
‘prosecute[d] any protestors for activities taking place on the 
sidewalk’ and ‘did not seek injunctive relief against individuals 
whose conduct was the impetus for the Ordinance.’”  Id. at 167 
(second alteration in original) (quoting Turco v. City of 
Englewood, No. 2:15-cv-03008, 2017 WL 5479509, at *5 
(D.N.J. Nov. 14, 2017)).  The ultimate question remains 
whether a restriction on speech “burden[s] substantially more 
speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate 
interests.”  McCullen, 573 U.S. at 486 (emphasis added) 
(quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799).   
 
Consistent with Madsen and Schenck, the Ordinance, as 
we have construed it, does not do so.22  The Ordinance 
                                              
22 We recognize that the City may have a legitimate 
concern about access to healthcare facilities if it transpires that 
multiple one-on-one conversations impair access to the 
facilities, see McCullen, 573 U.S. at 486–87, and that the City 
may then have occasion to revisit the terms of the Ordinance 
having developed a record that would satisfy McCullen and 
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therefore is “narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest,” McCullen, 573 U.S. at 477 (quoting 
Ward, 491 U.S. at 791), and it satisfies intermediate scrutiny.  
 
D. Overbreadth 
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the Ordinance is 
unconstitutionally overbroad because it authorizes the City to 
create buffer zones at any health facility in the City, regardless 
of whether the City has identified a problem at the location in 
the past.  A law may be overbroad under the First Amendment 
where “a substantial number of its applications are 
unconstitutional, judged in relation to the [law’s] plainly 
legitimate sweep.”  Bruni I, 824 F.3d at 374 (quoting Stevens, 
559 U.S. at 473).  The overbreadth doctrine is “strong 
medicine,” Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1265 
(3d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted), should therefore be “used 
sparingly,” id., and will “not be[] invoked when a limiting 
construction has been or could be placed on the challenged” 
law, Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). 
 
 Plaintiffs’ overbreadth challenge is not well-founded.  
As a general matter, “[t]he fact that the coverage of a statute is 
broader than the specific concern that led to its enactment is of 
no constitutional significance,” Hill, 530 U.S. at 730–31, and 
its applicability more generally is one of the reasons that we 
consider it to be a content-neutral restriction on speech, see id. 
at 731. For that reason, “[w]hen a buffer zone broadly applies 
to health care facilities” to include “buffer zones at non-
                                              
Bruni I, as well as the content-neutrality requirement of Reed.  
See Turco, 935 F.3d at 162–63.  That, however, is not the 
Ordinance before us today. 
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abortion related locations,” we may then “conclude ‘the 
comprehensiveness of the statute is a virtue, not a vice, because 
it is evidence against there being a discriminatory 
governmental motive.’”  Turco, 935 F.3d at 171 (quoting Hill, 
530 U.S. at 730–31).   
 
Nor is the Ordinance overbroad because it affords the 
City discretion to select particular health facilities at which it 
will demarcate a buffer zone.  Since the demarcation 
requirement was put in place approximately ten years ago, the 
City has exercised that discretion as to only two facilities, both 
of which suffered from violence and obstruction in the past.  
Yet we may not, as Plaintiffs suggest, simply assume that “the 
statute’s very existence may cause others not before the court 
to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or 
expression.”  Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612.  Instead, we revert 
again to the “principle . . . well-established in First 
Amendment jurisprudence”—“our duty to ‘accord a measure 
of deference to the judgment’ of [the] city council,’” Turco, 
935 F.3d at 171 (quoting Hill, 530 U.S. at 727), considering 
“[the] statute’s application to real-world conduct, not fanciful 
hypotheticals,” id. at 172 (quoting Stevens, 559 U.S. at 485).  
Applying that principle here, we conclude the Ordinance is not 
substantially overbroad. 
 
In sum, Plaintiffs have not carried their “burden of 
demonstrating, ‘from the text of [the law] and from actual fact,’ 
that substantial overbreadth exists.”  Virginia v. Hicks, 539 
U.S. 113, 122 (2003) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).  
We therefore affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment to the City on this claim. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order granting summary judgment. 
Nikki Bruni et al. v. City of Pittsburgh et al. (Bruni II), No. 18-
1084 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 I join the Court’s opinion because it rightly construes 
the Pittsburgh Ordinance to allow conversation on a public 
sidewalk. I write separately to highlight the impact of Reed v. 
Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). In my view, Reed 
weakened precedents cited in the Court’s content neutrality 
analysis and will constrain Pittsburgh’s enforcement of the 
Ordinance going forward. 
I 
 It is true that the Supreme Court has held that restricting 
“congregating, picketing, patrolling, [and] demonstrating” 
around abortion clinics is facially content neutral. Madsen v. 
Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 759, 757–65 (1994); 
see Op. 26–27. The Court has even extended this content 
neutrality to “wildly expansive definitions” of “demonstrate” 
and “picket.” Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 744 (2000) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting); see id. at 721–22 (majority opinion) 
(“defining ‘demonstrate’ as ‘to make a public display of 
sentiment for or against a person or cause’ and ‘picket’ as an 
effort ‘to persuade or otherwise influence’” (quoting Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary 600, 1710 (1993))); see 
also Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 
374 n.6, 381–82 (1997) (upholding injunction against 
“demonstrating,” even though it would target some “stationary, 
nonobstructive demonstrations”).  
 The continued vitality of this content neutrality analysis 
is questionable after Reed. Before Reed, the Court vacillated 
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between two tests for content neutrality. See generally 
Genevieve Lakier, Reed v Town of Gilbert, Arizona, and the 
Rise of the Anticlassificatory First Amendment, 2016 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 233; Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The 
Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 
63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 413 (1996). In cases like Hill, Schenck, and 
Madsen, the “government’s purpose [w]as the threshold 
consideration.” Madsen, 512 U.S. at 763; see Hill, 530 U.S. at 
719; Schenck, 519 U.S. at 371–74 & n.6 (relying solely on 
Madsen to hold injunction content neutral). But in other cases, 
the Court’s first consideration was whether a law “draw[s] 
content-based distinctions on its face.” McCullen v. Coakley, 
573 U.S. 464, 479 (2014). Any law that did so was necessarily 
content based, no matter the government’s purpose. See, e.g., 
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims 
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116–17, 122 n.* (1991).  
 Reed adopted the latter test for content neutrality. It held 
that “[a] law that is content based on its face is subject to strict 
scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, 
content-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the 
ideas contained’ in the regulated speech.” 135 S. Ct. at 2228 
(quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 
429 (1993)); see id. at 2237–39 (Kagan, J., concurring in the 
judgment). By doing so, Reed “overturn[ed] the standard that 
[the Court] had previously used to resolve a particular class of 
cases”—a class that includes cases like this one and Hill. Brian 
A. Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent 31 (2016) 
(citing Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66–67 
(1996), and Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 
682, 691–93 (3d Cir. 1991), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992)). In fact, Reed rebuked Hill several times: by 
noting that the errant Court of Appeals relied on it, 135 S. Ct. 
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at 2226; and by favorably citing dissents in Hill authored by 
Justices Scalia and Kennedy, id. at 2229. 
 Reed also seems to have expanded the types of laws that 
are facially content based. Facial distinctions, the Court 
explained, may not only be “obvious, defining regulated 
speech by particular subject matter.” Id. at 2227. They may also 
be “subtle, defining regulated speech by its function or 
purpose.” Id. Two cases discussed in Reed exemplify this 
subtle content discrimination.  
The first, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., involved a law that 
restricted the sale, disclosure, and use of information about 
drug prescriptions. See 564 U.S. 552, 563–64 (2011); Reed, 
135 S. Ct. at 2227. The Court held content based a provision 
that allowed the sale of that information for “‘educational 
communications,’” but not for “marketing.” Sorrell, 564 U.S. 
at 564 (quoting Vt. Stat. Ann., tit. 18, § 4631(e)(4) (Supp. 
2010)). “[E]ducation[ ]” and “marketing” are examples of 
speech’s “function or purpose” under Reed. 135 S. Ct. at 2227. 
They explain how or why a speaker speaks, not what is said. Id.  
 The second case that underscores the protection 
afforded to speech’s function or purpose is NAACP v. Button, 
371 U.S. 415 (1963). See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2229. In that case, 
Virginia “attempt[ed] to use a statute prohibiting ‘improper 
solicitation’ by attorneys to outlaw litigation-related speech of 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People.” Id. (quoting Button, 371 U.S. at 438). The Button 
Court rejected that attempt, holding that “advocacy” and “‘the 
opportunity to persuade to action’” are First Amendment 
rights. 371 U.S. at 437–38 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 
U.S. 516, 537 (1945)). Describing the Virginia law over 50 
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years later, the Reed Court called it “facially content-based.” 
135 S. Ct. at 2229.  
  So Reed demands that we construe the Ordinance 
narrowly. And it steers us away from precedents that focused 
on a law’s purpose rather than its facial effect. For laws once 
held content neutral because of purpose may well be facially 
content based after Reed. Compare, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 720–
21 (holding content neutral a ban on “picketing,” 
“demonstrating,” “protest, education, or counseling” even 
though it may require the government “to review the content 
of the statements made”), with McCullen, 573 U.S. at 479 
(“The [buffer zone law] would be content based if it required 
‘enforcement authorities’ to ‘examine the content of the 
message that is conveyed . . . .’” (quoting FCC v. League of 
Women Voters of Ca., 468 U.S. 364, 383 (1984))), and Reed, 
135 S. Ct. at 2227–29 (highlighting facially content based laws 
that target solicitation and educational communications). Even 
some purposes previously held content neutral may now be 
content based. Compare, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 716 (citing 
“[t]he unwilling listener’s interest in avoiding unwanted 
communication”), and Turco v. City of Englewood, 935 F.3d 
155, 162, 166-67 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing that interest to support 
narrow tailoring of concededly content neutral law), with 
McCullen, 573 U.S. at 481 (“To be clear, the Act would not be 
content neutral if it were concerned with undesirable effects 
that arise from ‘the direct impact of speech on its audience’ or 
‘[l]isteners’ reactions to speech.’” (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 
U.S. 312, 321 (1988))), and Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227 
(protecting speech’s “function or purpose”).  
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II 
 Today our Court does what Reed requires. We hold that 
“[b]ecause the Ordinance, as properly interpreted, does not 
extend to sidewalk counseling—or any other calm and 
peaceful one-on-one conversations,” the City cannot examine 
the content of a conversation to decide whether a violation has 
occurred. Op. 27–28. It will instead examine, for example, 
decibel level, the distance between persons, the number of 
persons, the flow of traffic, and other things usually unrelated 
to the content or intent of speech. See, e.g., Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 
2228 (confirming that banning sound amplification is content 
neutral); id. at 2232 (stating that “entirely forbidding the 
posting of signs” is content neutral); McCullen, 573 U.S. at 
491–92 (collecting laws that, by penalizing conduct like 
obstruction or assault, may pass intermediate scrutiny).  
 The Court’s decision constrains the City’s enforcement 
discretion. Pittsburgh cannot target quiet conversations even if 
they are not in a tone of “kindness, love, hope, gentleness, and 
help.” Op. 11 n.6 (quoting JA 574a); see, e.g., id. at 25–26. It 
must allow not only conversations that help and love, but also 
those that serve any other “function or purpose” within the 
bounds of protected speech. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227; see, e.g., 
id. at 2228–29 (discussing Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 563–64 
(“educati[ng]” and “marketing”), and Button, 371 U.S. at 438–
40 (“solicit[ing],” “advoca[ting],” and “urg[ing]”)).  
And the City’s enforcement of the Ordinance must be 
evenhanded. Consider clinic employees and agents who, under 
the injunction issued in Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, can 
“congregate” or “patrol” when helping persons enter or exit a 
clinic. See 586 F.3d 263, 273–75 (3d Cir. 2009); Brown v. City 
of Pittsburgh, 2010 WL 2207935, at *2 n.2 (W.D. Pa. May 27, 
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2010); JA 1324a (permanent injunction order). Before today, 
the City’s broad and amorphous interpretation of the Ordinance 
risked allowing those employees to engage in speech that 
others could not. That sort of disparate treatment would now 
be content or viewpoint based. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2230 
(citing Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 
U.S. 819 (1995), and Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 
(2010)). Our decision today clarifies that the words 
“congregate” and “patrol” address conduct—the assembly of 
people in one place or the action of pacing back and forth. See 
Op. 25. So interpreted, the Brown injunction’s narrow 
exception does not discriminate between types of speech. 
With these understandings, I join the Court’s opinion. 
